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This is a critical, yet hopeful, survey of the value of social capital to 
understanding the prevailing conditions in Iraq.  The abundance of failures and 
paucity of progress in promoting a peaceful, stable, and democratic Iraq can be 
directly attributed to the lack of social capital between United States reconstruction 
representatives, the U.S. military and Iraqi civilians.  The utility of social capital to 
the future of Iraq will be demonstrated in the following relationship: As social 
capital between the U.S. military, U.S. reconstruction authorities, and common 
Iraqis increases, the security and overall quality of life for Iraqis will increase. 
Iraq is listed second, just ahead of Somalia and behind Sudan, in Foreign 
Policy’s influential “Failed States Index for 2007.”  Seventy-five percent of Iraqis 
describe the state of security in Iraq as “poor” (IRI, 2006, 29).  Iraqis do not have 
access to basic services including electricity, food, or even potable water because 
of this lack of security.  Four million Iraqis are considered “food insecure and in 
need of food assistance” (UNAMI, 2007, 2).  Only one in three children in Iraq 
under the age of five has access to safe drinking water (UNICEF, 2007).  More 
than 80,000 Iraqi citizens have lost their lives since the invasion of 2003 (Iraq 
Body Count, 2007).  Over 4,000 coalition troops have suffered the same fate 
(icasualties, 2007).  More importantly to our study, common citizens do not trust 
their neighbors, the coalition and Iraqi security forces trying to protect them, or 
their representatives in government.  Indeed, most would agree with a recent CSIS 
report claiming that the central government is less and less relevant to what 
happens in Iraq (CSIS, 2007).  The fundamental source of conflict in Iraq is 
doubtless the “competition among ethnic and sectarian communities for power and 
resources” (Petreaus Report, 2007, 2).  Iraqis and U.S. analysts alike are asking the 
same question:  how did we get to this point?   
American policy errors ran the gamut from political miscalculation and 
economic misallocation to social misunderstanding and military mismanagement.  
Past mistakes in policy formulation and implementation will offer us a portal 
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through which to see the position social capital occupied in the reconstruction 
equation.  Social capital is both an index of the overall conditions in Iraq and a 
vehicle for improvement.  It is the hope of the author that any lessons or warnings 
gleaned from this analysis will be applied to mitigating suffering and promoting 
understanding in future circumstances.   
Policy error and military failure combined to repress the formation of social 
capital, in many cases even eroding existing social capital, and directly contributed 
to civil strife in Iraq.  Economic liberalization was prioritized over stability.  A 
centralized and callous decision-making apparatus was favored by the Coalition 
Provisional Authority.  The misunderstandings between Iraqis and coalition forces 
stemming from a complete lack of adequate training (particularly in cultural 
sensitivity), and copious misapplications of US power and resources illustrated the 
unpreparedness of the US military to be part of a nation-building effort.  An 
assessment of social capital offers a more compelling explanation for the violence 
and continued instability in Iraq than political incompetence or economic 
stagnation.  National reconciliation, seized upon by figures in the US public as the 
key to success in Iraq, is possible not through political initiative, but by a surge of 
social capital. 
This will not be an exhaustive study of all that went wrong in Iraq or even a 
general exploration of the efficacy of political policies, as taken by both the Iraqi 
and US governments.  This will be a focused study, treating political decisions, 
military strategies, and economic policies only in so much as they are directly 
relevant to the formation or erosion of social capital.  There will be no discussion 
of the reasons to go to war in Iraq, nor any recommendation of the criteria for 
intervention.  The United States, for reasons of obligation and capability, will be 
treated as the primary agent for change.  As the security and political situation 
continues to evolve the Iraqi government will take over the mantle of primary 
effecter but with 130,000 foreign occupying troops still present we are not yet at 
that stage. 
Conceptually, this paper will rely on the theory of social capital as described by 
the eminent sociologist Robert D. Putnam in his 2000 work, Bowling Alone.  
Putnam concentrates on the decline of church attendance, volunteering, 
membership in groups, letter writing, and even league bowling.  While data exist 
on the amount of television Iraqis watch per day,2 and even the type of 
programming they favor, our discussion of social capital in Iraq will depend on 
                                                 
2 In response to “How many hours of TV do you watch per day?” 31 percent of Iraqis replied 2-4 
hours, 26% 1-2 hours, 18% 4-6 hours, 10% more than 6 hours, 7% less than 1 hour, and 5% zero 
hours (IRI, 2006).  This is in sharp contrast to the 7-8 hours the average American watched in 
1998 (Putnam, 2000, 222). 
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other evidentiary assets.  This study will depend on informal evidence, supporting 
anecdotal information with quantitative data when available and appropriate.  First-
hand accounts, like those of former Iraqi minister of defense Ayed Allawi and 
front-line news reporters Michael Yon and Nir Rosen, will complement 
statistically based policy recommendations offered by the World Bank and the UN 
Assistance Mission in Iraq.  The value of social capital to the economy of Iraq will 
be explored through the official polices of US reconstruction authorities and, as a 
counterpoint, the informal economy studies of Robert Looney.  Security will be a 
consuming theme in this work and will be treated through the use of independent 
security contractors.  The role of the military in promoting social capital will be 
considered through the counterinsurgency strategies of General David H. Petraeus.  
Case-studies, including the Local Governance Program and USAID educational 
reform, will also figure prominently. 
Social capital is the value wrought from social networks.  An increase or 
decrease in social connections between people, both of a quantitative and 
qualitative nature, affects the nature of the relationship between those groups and 
individuals.  There are two types of social capital, “bonding” and “bridging” 
(Putnam, 2000, 22).  Bonding forces tend to insulate a group, composed of people 
with common interests, ethnicity, or other distinction, from interacting with 
dissimilar groups.  Bridging forces, as one would expect, create opportunities for 
interactions between diverse groups.  It would not be an overstatement to say that 
the reconciliation of the Iraqi people depends squarely on the ability of US troops 
and civil society representatives to facilitate the creation of bridging social capital 
between disparate factions. 
The endemic violence saturating US headlines and Iraqi lives in 2006 and 2007, 
whether resulting from sectarian feud, transnational terrorist activity, or insurgent 
uprising, will be approached with an eye toward the formation and erosion of 
social capital.  Al Qaeda, the numerous Shia and Sunni sectarian militias, and 
Kurdish organizations like the PKK all represent groups formed out of bonding 
social capital.  These exclusionist groups fill the vacuums left by local government 
and non-governmental organizations by providing “crucial social and 
psychological support for less fortunate members of the community, while 
furnishing start-up financing, markets, and reliable labor for local entrepreneurs” 
(Putnam, 2000, 22).  A potential problem with bonding social capital is that by 
encouraging “strong in-group loyalty, [it] may also create strong out-group 
antagonism” (Putnam, 2000, 23).  In a country occupied by foreign soldiers and 
teetering on the brink of mass sectarian violence, it is easy to see how groups 
formed out of bonding forces have slid into violent extremism.  Psychologists have 
contemplated this shift, suggesting that the “black and white nature of most 
extremist ideologies is often attractive to those who feel overwhelmed by the 
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complexity and stress of navigating a complicated world” (Borum, 2004, 26).  The 
Army’s new counterinsurgency manual reinforces this basis for attraction:  
 
Recruits are often young men suffering from frustrated hopes and unable to 
improve their lot in life.  The insurgent group provides them identity, 
purpose, and community in addition to physical, economic, and 
psychological identity. (COIN, 2006, 21)   
 
Social capital is a dynamic force that can be manipulated to incite violence just as 
easily as it can be used to mitigate it.   
Several decisions were made in the immediate aftermath of the invasion of Iraq 
that determined the priority social capital was to occupy in the course of the 
conflict.  Some of the most egregious errors include a lack of appreciation for the 
nuanced history of Iraq’s diverse communities, a stubborn attachment to 
preconceived (read American) ideas of progress, the adoption of a top-down and 
highly centralized interpretation of government, an unwillingness to explore 
diverse or creative solutions, and the emphasizing of economic liberalization and 
political party development over civil society.  The decision to disband the Iraqi 
Army in the wake of the capitulation of Saddam’s forces is where we will start.  
The disbandment of the Iraqi Army was based on several presumptions:  that the 
army was a representation and tool of the Baath party, that the Iraqi people did not 
trust the army, and that if the army was left intact the Baath party and all its 
associated dictatorial connotations would survive as well (Bremer, 2007).  What 
Paul Bremer, Donald Rumsfeld, and the rest of the Bush administration failed to 
include in their calculus was the value of the Iraqi Army as an existing set of social 
connections.  Their fixation with the Baath party as a monolithic set of Saddam 
supporters blinded them to the potential usefulness of leaving this social network 
intact.  Keeping the Iraqi Army would not have heralded a return to the Saddam 
regime, but rather would have demonstrated to the Iraqi people that America was 
not going to unilaterally impose its will.  Engaging with the Iraqi Army, and 
vetting it of genuine Baathist war criminals in the process, would have given us a 
pipeline rich in social capital and authenticated our promise to listen to the needs 
of the Iraqi people.  Clearly, the Bush administration did not study the lessons of 
the Vietnam War, namely that “actions directed at one ‘audience’ might affect 
others in an undesirable way” (Gaddis, 2004, 231).  The dismissed Baathist Army 
Officers were doubtless the same people that organized and participated in the 
early, and continuing, stages of the insurgency in Iraq.  By “wiping the slate clean” 
we exposed our weaknesses, shortcomings, and general bewilderment; the “total 
strangeness of the Iraqi social, political, institutional, and economic landscape” 
(Allawi, 2007, 127).  The effect was that we increasingly drove ourselves into a 
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“physical and psychological ghetto” (Allawi, 2007, 127).  The disbandment of the 
Iraqi Army ensured we started off in a ghetto of social capital.   
The security void left in the wake of the disbandment of the Iraqi Army was 
enormous.  A single Iraqi Army battalion existed seven months after the fall of 
Baghdad (Slevin, 2003).  This security void was to be filled only partially by 
enlisted American military personnel.  The rest would be shouldered by 
independent security contractors.  In the study of social capital, security is one of 
the foundational blocks that must be present for more involved exercises to take 
place.  Security and insurance costs, 20 to 40 percent of contracts by some 
estimates, have greatly diminished the impact of reconstruction projects 
(International Bank, 2005).  Social capital teaches us that collective security 
projects can create positive externalities.  After all, if someone ensures your safety, 
whether a defense contractor or a neighborhood watch, you benefit even if you 
“spend most of [your] time on the road and never even nod to another resident on 
the street” (Putnam, 2000, 20).  These immediate positives, however, must be 
weighed against the long-term negatives of using independent security contractors.  
Unlike United States military and reconstruction representatives, independent 
security contractors are held accountable to few and operate under a minimalist 
definition of duty and obligation.  That is to say, contractors work to satisfy the 
conditions of their contract.  As representatives of the US government and the 
American people, the military and diplomatic personnel are held to a higher 
standard and commit themselves to broader definitions of duty and obligation.  
More directly, security contractors can be highly corrosive to social capital because 
they are not connected to the Iraqi people, and because they disrupt attempts to 
build social capital among Iraqis and US soldiers through their shoot-first 
mentality. 
A House Oversight and Government Reform Committee memo found that the 
security contractor Blackwater fired first in 80 percent of the shooting incidents 
(House, 2007).  Iraqis are terrified of Blackwater and other independent security 
contractors.  As a heavily armed force with little to no oversight and a propensity 
to fire first, it’s no wonder why.   Many independent security employees are former 
U.S., British, or Australian soldiers.  Often sporting weapons and body armor 
similar to that of U.S. troops, it is easy to see how Iraqis could become confused.  
On a visceral level one wonders what this does to their level of trust in the 
intentions of the United States, as well as the ability of US forces to protect them.  
 As a response to calls for greater oversight, a recent agreement between the 
Pentagon and State Department spelled out rules and guidelines for the use of 
private security contractors.  It also allowed for contractors to be punished under 
US criminal law (Jelinek, 2007).  This is an errant attempt to bring a force 
corrosive to social capital to heel.  Not all contractors, and certainly not all their 
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employees, are American or even US-based.  Why would they then fall under the 
jurisdiction of US criminal law?  And, why only security contractors?  Why don’t 
translators or reconstruction contractors fall under US law as well?  Iraqi 
authorities have demanded that private contractors be subjected to Iraqi law.  
Rather than allow the Iraqi government to show their people, and the rest of the 
world, that they are not impotent puppets to the coalition, US officials have 
ignored them as if they were children asking for their allowance.  While due 
process may be an evolving concept in the Iraqi legal system, US representatives 
must recognize that Iraqi courts are the appropriate mechanism by which 
independent contractors, now enjoying a status akin to the British in Egypt under 
the Capitulations agreement, can be reconnected to the society they have wronged.   
 Performing the duties of a defense contractor is a very challenging task.  The 
recently posted contract for the Ministry of the Interior requests that the winning 
contractor be able to possess the following materials and be able to perform the 
following tasks: trainers must have armed guards and armored SUVs for prompt 
transportation, they must develop a Quick Reaction Force (QRF) and have a QRF 
of their own able to respond in less than 10 minutes, the contractor must supply 
dog teams for explosive detection and crowd control, and the contractor must be 
able to communicate in Arabic or provide an interpreter (Pincus, 2007).  Nowhere 
in this help-wanted advertisement is there a requirement for the contractors to have 
the “best interests of the Iraqi nation at heart” or even for the contractors to 
“promote democratic values.”  Independent security contractors are simply 
responding to demand, filling a void left by the inadequate numbers of formal 
protection available.  US diplomatic officials and their Iraqi counterparts use 
independent security contractors because of their ease of availability and ease of 
implementation (Stratfor, 2007).3  In other words, security contractors are more 
economically and politically efficient.  Our mission in Iraq has to be about more 
than efficiency.  Independent security contractors are self-interested.  When the 
welfare of a nation is at stake, however, there must be safeguards against the 
“subordination of strategic interests to those of the organization implementing the 
strategy” (Gaddis, 2004, 233).  In short, the proliferation of civic values through 
social connections isn’t in the job description for defense contractors.  Independent 
security contractors, born out of poor policy decisions by the US administration 
and the preoccupation of the US military with economic efficiency, have had an 
undeniably negative effect on social capital formation in Iraq.  
The Bush Administration’s obsession with economic liberalism was not limited 
to the world-wide advocation of a free market approach, failed health care plans, or 
                                                 
3 Independent security contractor casualties are not made available to the media, another way in 
which contractors are more politically useful considering the public’s aversion to US deaths.  
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free trade policies.  The crass and presumptuous economic policies the US 
Occupation Authorities enforced in Iraq prioritized economic capital at the expense 
of social capital.  World Bank officials, seemingly oblivious to the potential for 
civil unrest during an occupation by a foreign military, claimed that in post-war 
Iraq “economic efficiency of public expenditures would move to the center stage” 
(Edirinsighe, 2004, 66).  US representatives presumed economic growth would 
placate the Iraqi public, ignorant of the fact that “businessmen had a very low 
reputation in Iraq” (Allawi, 2007, 380).  Acculturated in Saddam’s domination of 
the public sphere, Iraqis were naturally accustomed to seeing merchants “described 
by the government and the media as greedy, grasping, and steeped in unethical 
practices” (Allawi, 2007, 380).  Keeping the UN Oil-for-Food scandal in mind, it’s 
easy to see how Iraqis doubted the altruism of US economic initiatives.  Social 
protection is the key to the food marketing system in Iraq, this fact cannot be 
overstated.  The Public Distribution System (PDS), instituted by Saddam Hussein 
as a response to US sanctions, is the source of food for many Iraqis.  The World 
Bank saw the danger in that “at least half the poor (25% of the population) are 
almost fully dependent on the PDS transfers,” and acknowledged that a 
“breakdown in the food transfer-marketing system” would be the “worst thing that 
could happen in the transitional situation Iraq is facing now” (Edirinsighe, 2004, 
13).  
 The proposed solution to the economic efficiencies permeating the food 
marketing system in Iraq, increasing private control over food marketing in Iraq, 
was impractical and negligent considering the security situation in Iraq.  
Widespread fear and distrust stemming from the insurgency was multiplied by the 
failure of US authorities to secure the wheat and cereal Iraqis depended on to 
survive.  The US failed to see the potential value of social capital in the situation.  
The PDS was not obsolete or irrelevant now that sanctions had been lifted, as 
claimed by World Bank officials (Edirinsinghe, 2004, 11).   Taking over the PDS, 
originally designed to assure “basic food security to the entire population, and 
[maintain] political stability (Edirinsinghe, 2004, 66),” would have immediately 
given US soldiers an avenue to display their commitment to Iraqi communities.  In 
2007 US soldiers in Baqoubah finally got to do what one soldier called “the most 
important thing we’ve done” (Lair, 2007).  After fighting back Al-Qaeda the US 
military assumed the duties of the PDS and delivered 560 tons of wheat to people 
in the Diyala province.  Not knowing exactly how the system worked soldiers 
learned through interaction: 
 
The system of what people expect was learned through long conversations 
with local sheikhs and government officials, often in smoke-filled offices 
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over cups of chai or seated around the family living rooms of local leaders. 
(Lair, 2007) 
 
The obtuse economic policies of the US Occupation Authorities, oriented towards 
macroeconomic growth instead of the improvement of the daily lives of Iraqis, is 
just another instance of the devaluation of social capital in Iraq.  
The violent fluctuations of the Iraqi economy and inability of the government to 
provide for the basic services of its citizens led to the creation of an informal 
economy in Iraq.  In this way the development of an informal economy in Iraq 
followed a “pattern seen in other parts of the world—the informal economy tends 
to grow during periods of political, economic, and social crises” (Looney, 2006, 4).  
US economic analysts have been slow to pick up on the relevance and implications 
of the informal economy.  Without a doubt attempts must be made to “integrate the 
analysis and qualification of the informal economy into an overall review of 
economic and military developments in Iraq” (Looney, 2006, 4).  The potential for 
insurgent groups to penetrate and use informal economies to their advantage must 
be counseled.  An informal economy, arising out of an environment of uncertainty 
and distrust, depends on limited trust networks between friends and family.  
Extended trust networks, networks of social capital in which “individuals enter into 
a transaction with only limited information about the counterpart’s specific 
attributes,” are the key to developing the economy in Iraq (Looney, 2006, 9): 
   
The key challenge facing the economy is developing the conditions 
conducive to the creation and growth of extended trust networks to 
encourage the growth and development of this type of networking. (Looney, 
2006, 16)   
 
The centralized, top-down approach of US economic policy-makers and 
implementers must be abandoned for one that is “decentralized and inclusive” 
(Looney, 2006, 27).  In short, it must be recognized that when economic and 
political activity is “embedded in dense networks of social interaction, incentives 
for opportunism and malfeasance are reduced” (Putnam, 2000, 21).  
The reconstruction of Iraq’s educational system was another battlefield to be 
won or lost by Washington’s decision makers.  The US Agency for International 
Development was well aware of this and instituted a program in which “in a one-
year period, USAID rehabilitated about 2,400 schools, nearly one-fifth of Iraq’s 
schools, and distributed nearly nine million science and math textbooks” (Allawi, 
2007, 382).  Nevertheless the program was the subject of much criticism, acutely 
after it was a revealed a “large portion of the textbook contracts were awarded to 
printers outside Iraq” (Allawi, 2007, 383).  Education is central in the process of 
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socialization.  The classroom is the factory of human capital and facilitator of 
social capital.  In Iraq fewer and fewer children were going to school.  It was 
reported that only “28% of Iraq’s graduation-age population (17 year olds) in the 
centre and south sat their final exams in 2007 (2006/2007 school year), according 
to the Ministry of Education” (UNAMI, 2007).  The pressures of the civil unrest in 
Iraq clearly affected the performance of those that did stay: “Of those who sat the 
exams only 40 percent passed, a decrease from 60 percent passed in 2006” 
(UNAMI, 2007).  Some of the older students who left the classroom joined the 
insurgency while the rest stayed at home, afraid to venture outside of the relative 
safety of their homes.  This is a clear erosion of social capital; the true debt caused 
by this education gap may not be incurred for years.  Strategies to combat this 
slippery slope exist, such as “sowing dissent among radicals” and “intervening in 
schools, churches, and prisons to prevent radicalization” (Summit, 2005).  Even 
something as small as the content of textbooks can have national repercussions: 
  
The content of textbooks became a leit-motif of the Iraqi condition.  Issues 
of secularism and religion, the privileged position of Islam in society, liberal 
values versus traditional cultures, co-existence of Arab and Kurdish 
nationalisms, the varying Shi’a and Sunni interpretations of historical and 
religious issues—the list went to the heart of the Iraqi dilemma. (Allawi, 
2007, 384) 
 
A discussion of social capital in Iraq without considering religion would be 
negligent.  Religion in Iraq was not a subject to go wanting in both Iraqi and US 
forums of discussion.  Under the Baathist regime religion was mostly secularized.  
Right under the surface, however, was a devout community of believers.  
Unfortunately most of the attention has been diverted to the role of religion in the 
political institutions of Iraq.  Statistics like “49% of Iraqis choose clerics or 
religious leaders as their first choice for the drafters of their constitution (by 
comparison only 13.9% designated their political party representatives as their first 
choice) (IRI, 2005, 28)” grab US headlines but do not contribute to the 
understanding of the high levels of violence in Iraq.  Our discussion centers on the 
role of religion as an impetus to the formation of social capital.  Islam must be 
approached not as just a faith or a collection of practices but as an “identity and 
loyalty—for many an identity and loyalty that transcends all others” (Lewis, 2003, 
17).4  In the cauldron of violence and illegitimacy of Iraq, “religious observance 
                                                 
4 The International Republican Institute (2006) found that of the TV programming that Iraqis 
typically view, 31% is related to religion.   
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became a matter of affirming one’s particular identity, transcending other 
considerations and scruples” (Allawi, 2007, 384). 
Religious leaders and groups are the gatekeepers of legitimacy in Iraq.  Through 
the adulations and admonitions of imams on the day of prayer (Friday), the fates of 
many nascent political and civil society projects are decided.  Religious groups are 
also the arbiters of information, sharing stories about a community’s history that 
“provide models of how actions and consequences are linked and are often the 
basis for strategies, actions and interpretation of the intentions of other actors” 
(COIN, 2006, 21).  Religious councils and organizations represent a point of 
inflection for social capital.  That is to say, they are a latent network of social 
connections that can be spurned or included.  Bernard Rougier, a French 
sociologist, was a witness to the indoctrination of extremist groups in Lebanon.  
Rougier spent five years living among Palestinian refugees in the most densely 
populated Palestinian refugee camp in Lebanon.  He noted the transformation of 
identity in extremist groups caused by the 
 
real-time production of salafist-jihadist ideology, the way preachers played a 
decisive role in reframing social reality exclusively in religious categories, 
and the deep changes that those networks effect in perceptions of self and 
other. (Rougier, 2007, 22)  
 
A similar transformation has occurred in Iraq.  As a function of social capital, 
religion in Iraq must be treated with sensitivity and must always be engaged in 
dialogue. 
Fundamentalists and extremist groups manipulate social capital and religion for 
their own purposes.  They deny affiliation with or sympathy towards a larger 
national Iraqi cause and tend to adopt an encompassing worldview that affirms 
their exalted position as compared to the masses (Antoun, 2001).  At times they 
manipulate this position to portray themselves as the “voice of the people,” while 
at other times they distance themselves to emphasize their purity of purpose 
(Antoun, 2001).  For extremist groups it is less in the religious character of their 
message itself than in how persuasive it is.  As others have observed, Osama Bin 
Laden’s success in advocating violence lies not in his religious piety, but in his 
ability to construct and articulate a “consistent, convincing case that an attack on 
Islam is under way and is being led and directed by America” (Scheuer, 2005, 7).  
For extremist groups violent action became an injunction from God, impossible to 
ignore.  Insurgents, likewise, were held together by “family loyalties, tribal 
affiliations or a commitment to an extreme form of Islamism” (Allawi, 2007, 180).  
US strategizers failed to realize that “action in defense of identity and authenticity 
can be more fundamental than action in defense of interests” (Thomas, 2003, 32). 
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Preventing the radicalization of disaffected Iraqis will depend on initiatives 
similar to a plan the United Kingdom Department for Communities and Local 
Government developed concentrating on promoting shared values including faith 
based platforms, supporting local solutions, creating forums on extremism, and 
engaging areas of radicalization like religious schools by monitoring curricula 
(Preventing, 2007).  It will also depend on the development of democratic 
institutions as avenues of expression that can reduce tensions.  In Crimea the 
minority Muslim Tartars were able to avert ethno-religious conflict by relying on 
their existing democratic structures.  The leaders of the Tartar legislative body, or 
Mejlis, were challenged by radicals but “swiftly silenced the radicals with popular 
tolerance and education campaigns at local mosques” (Ziad, Chomiak, 2007). 
This paper seeks to convince all relevant actors of the value of social capital in 
Iraq by constructively analyzing the mistakes and failures made by the US military 
and Occupation Authorities, as well as highlighting the areas of progress.  In the 
second half of 2007 sectarian violence began to decline and the overall security 
situation in Iraq tentatively began to improve (Petreaus Report, 2007).  While these 
results may be preliminary, this paper will treat these improvements in peace and 
stability as an identifiable trend.  This reversal of course can be attributed to the 
encouragement of social capital between US personnel and Iraqis on a daily basis.  
How well these gains are consolidated will depend on the proper assessment of 
policies with social capital as the cornerstone.   
It is difficult to point to an event or date that signified the beginning of the 
insurgency in Iraq.  Regardless, the insurgency offers a window into the psyche of 
the Iraqi people.  In 2005, 48 percent of Iraqis felt their country was headed in the 
right direction (IRI, 2005).  In 2006 only 41 percent replied in the affirmative and 
19 percent said they didn’t know if their country was headed in the right direction, 
an increase of almost 8 percent over the previous year (IRI, 2006).  How the US 
has responded to the insurgency, from General Ricardo Sanchez to General David 
Petraeus, will weigh heavily in our discussion of the value of social capital in Iraq.   
Iraq has been a testing ground for the preparedness of the US military for 
counterinsurgencies, a type of asymmetrical warfare that most analysts agree will 
dominate the coming decades.  Reciprocity and trust are key concepts in 
understanding social capital.  Trust is an often precarious game of give and take, 
depending on the ability of the individual to “subordinate their own interests to 
those of larger groups and to associate and cooperate with each to achieve 
economic purposes and other social satisfactions” (Looney, 2006, 9).  Reciprocity 
and trust are social norms that can be understood to be phenomena driven by 
interaction, and as commodities “purchased” with credibility.  Therefore, in order 
to increase the social capital of a network involving skeptical groups, it is 
necessary to build trust and demonstrate commitment.  In short, with regards to the 
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US military and the insurgents, the Iraqi people will continuously ask “who will 
help them more, hurt them less, stay the longest, earn their trust” (Sewall, xxi).   
Facing a tenuous and foreign environment, and under heavy pressure to keep 
casualties to a minimum, the US military under General Sanchez adopted a “round 
them up and ask questions later” policy that certainly came back to haunt them.  
The majority of American troops stayed in large air-conditioned bases stationed 50 
miles outside of major population centers.  Cultural misunderstandings and general 
uncertainty create doubt as to the intentions of an intervening force.  US Marines, 
still toting their weapons and wearing their boots, walked into mosques during 
Friday prayers and mistakenly bound and handcuffed men in front of their families 
(Rosen, 2005).  In a culture based on patriarchy and tribal understandings of 
reputation, mistaken captures and interrogations became grave and unforgivable 
insults.  The US military failed to prevent the conditions leading to the insurgency, 
failed to identify the violence in Iraq as a popularly supported insurgency, and until 
recently fought a myopic campaign emphasizing tactical victories over a cohesive 
counterinsurgency strategy.  Increasing social capital between US forces and the 
Iraqi public would reduce uncertainty and allow intentions to be more clearly 
conveyed.   
Since General Petraeus took over on 26 January 2007 as the commander of the 
Multi-National Force in Iraq, the US military has adopted a counterinsurgency 
strategy.  Counterinsurgency warfare must be appreciated as the “most complex 
and maddening type of war” imaginable (Sewall, 2007).  Host governments risk 
legitimacy by relying on troops to win the support of their public.  Although civil 
society organizations and the military often share the same goals, namely to 
“stabilize and rebuild a country to the point where it no longer needs outside 
assistance,” they often perceive each other as having competing agendas (Taft, 
2006, 10).  Even the capacity of those institutions specializing in diplomacy and 
dialogue, like the US Department of State, is in question when considering the 
rigorous demands of a counterinsurgency campaign: “One fact sums it up: more 
people play in Army bands than serve in the US foreign service” (Sewall, 2007, 
xxx).  Ground forces, in the absence of adequate support, must be prepared to 
assume the roles of “mayor, trash collector, and public works employer” (Sewall, 
2007, xxxi).  Counterinsurgency strategies represent a stark departure from 
accepted military approaches: 
  
Conventional US doctrine has implicitly justified collateral damage in the 
name of decisive victory: while overwhelming force may inadvertently harm 
more noncombatants initially, it ultimately serves a humanitarian purpose by 
ending hostilities sooner. (Sewall, 2007, xxviii)   
 
 12 
The Value of Social Capital 
The Weinberger-Powell doctrine of overwhelming and decisive offensive force has 
almost no utility in counterinsurgency warfare.  In fact, the utility of force will 
decline the more you use it.  The safety of the troops themselves is secondary to 
that of the population.  Because insurgents often act in order to provoke retaliation, 
inaction may be the best response for the counterinsurgent.  All of this amounts to 
blasphemy in light of conventional military doctrine.   
Social protection, including the restoration of basic services, food security, and 
even “freedom from disease and the restoration of human dignity,” is paramount to 
a counterinsurgency campaign (Taft, 2005, 8).  While humanitarian interventions 
continue to have some hold on the conscience of the American public, 
counterinsurgency campaigns would not inspire the increasing militarization of 
American foreign policy.  The level of commitment on all levels a 
counterinsurgency campaign requires, in the way of human, technological, and 
especially psychological capital, strongly cautions against wars of opportunity.5  It 
is without question that one of the things the Counterinsurgency Manual hopes to 
impress upon the reader is that “if we wish to succeed with any approximation of 
honor, counterinsurgency will demand more than we are accustomed to giving” 
(Sewall, 2007, xxxviii). 
Counterinsurgency strategy amounts to nothing less than an operationalizing of 
social capital.  The tactics can range from issuing marines guides for cultural 
awareness (so-called “smart cards”) covering important ethnicities and religious 
holidays (Marine Corps, 2006),6 to a complete redesign of the deployment of 
American troops.  General Petraeus saw the error in keeping his troops cooped up 
in large “enduring bases” in that “if military forces stay locked up in compounds, 
they lose touch with the people, appear to be running scared, and cede the initiative 
to the insurgents” (COIN, 2007, 31).  The insurgency targeted segments of the 
population which were likely to swing the support of the general people, including 
doctors, professors, and lecturers (Allawi, 2007).7  Petraeus ordered his troops to 
live and operate in the neighborhoods they would have to protect, thereby adopting 
a strategy that “reinforces the connections with the people that establish real 
legitimacy” (COIN, 2007, 31).     
                                                 
5 Andrew Bacevich would likely disagree with this assessment citing the encroachment of 
counterinsurgency strategies on areas traditionally left to civil society and other actors 
(Bacevich, 2005). 
6 The 2006 version of the USMC smart card included useful cultural customs such as “admitting 
‘I don’t know’ is shameful for an Iraqi” and that “constructive criticism can be taken as an 
insult.”   
7 Occupation authorities actually fed this logic by assuming that the “more advanced the degrees 
held by the ministers the more competent the cabinet would be” (Allawi, 2007, 378).   
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In order to combat insurgent groups, which can be considered organizations 
competing for the support of the people, military commanders must “identify 
cleavages between groups and cross-cutting ties (for example, religious alignments 
that cut across ethnic differences)” (COIN, 2007, 51).  Combating insurgencies 
also means persuading the population through what the military calls 
“psychological operations,” in other words propaganda.  The psychological 
operations of the US military have lagged behind the increasingly sophisticated 
propaganda used by the insurgents.  The competing propaganda of insurgents can 
be seen as the outward face of an ideology.  Army commanders have pondered the 
attributes of ideology, stating it provides a “prism, including a vocabulary and 
analytical categories, through which the situation is assessed” (COIN, 2007, 21).  
This same ideology can also “shape the movement’s organization and operational 
methods” (COIN, 2007, 21).  Intelligence collection was another challenging 
process in Iraq.  The conditions in Iraq severely hampered conventional 
intelligence collection being as “officers of the CIA could not freely travel without 
conspicuous armed bodyguards” (Allawi, 2007, 127).  Intelligence in a 
counterinsurgency, generally regarded as the purview of the specialist, 8 instead 
becomes the duty of every soldier (COIN, 2007).   
In counterinsurgency campaigns the military must persuade the general 
population that it is there for their benefit.  The military in effect adopts a patron-
client relationship in which “an individual in a powerful position provides goods, 
services, or other resources to followers in exchange for political support or 
loyalty, amassing power” (COIN, 2007, 55).  In Anbar, Diyala, and various other 
provinces of Iraq, local militias have been incorporated into counterinsurgency 
security plans as “Concerned Local Nationals.”  In Anbar, the result has been 
particularly dramatic.  Monthly attack levels have declined from “some 1,350 in 
October 2006 to a bit over 200 in August of this year” (Petraeus, 2007, 4).  This 
was a direct result of the ability of the military to secure the support of the local 
populace.  In Baqoubah a former insurgent group, the 1920 Revolution Brigades, 
participated in patrols of their own communities with US soldiers (Yon, 2007).  
Tribal sheiks and former insurgent groups joined forces with the military in 
defiance of Al-Qaeda in Iraq, and as an expression of the increasing social capital 
between US troops and Iraqi citizens.  Policy makers would be rash to assume that 
the improved security in Anbar and other areas of Iraq was the result of US 
military strategy.  As common enemies were identified and common goals agreed 
upon, a symbiotic relationship coalesced between the US military and Iraqis.   
                                                 
8 There also exists a tension between expertise and application in the intelligence community.  
Michael Scheuer, a former CIA analyst, even claims that “expertise is a career killer” (Scheuer, 
2005, 245). 
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In some ways the military has embraced the analysis of social capital.  The 
military assesses the potential of insurgent organizations by graphing their social 
network.  This social network graph is based on the dyad, two nodes on a single 
line representing a connection between two people.  Links between nodes (people) 
are categorized by the nature of their relationship: “kinship (brother of), role based 
(boss of), affective (likes), interactive (prays with, demonstrates with), and 
affiliation (same clan, club)” (COIN, 2007, 215).  Military planners can also use 
this graph to assess the viability of the insurgency in more general terms.9  While 
couched in different language this social network graph amounts to nothing less 
than an operational depiction of the value of social capital to fighting the 
insurgency in Iraq. 
The success of a counterinsurgency plan will depend on how well it is 
implemented by the military, coordinated with the host government, complemented 
by civil society organizations, and accepted by the population.  We come full circle 
in realizing that a counterinsurgency plan, the most inclusive and flexible of any 
military strategy, has its limits.  Counterinsurgency doctrine is a vehicle, a means 
to an end and an implicit acquiescence to the “primacy of politics” (Sewall, 2007, 
xliii).   
While largely concentrating on the average citizen, counterinsurgency doctrine 
also recommends the creation of “coordinating mechanisms, such as committees or 
liaison elements to facilitate cooperation and build trust with HN [Host Nation] 
authorities” (COIN, 2007, 40).  These elements would assist implementation of 
other strategies by “reducing sensitivities and misunderstandings while removing 
impediments” (COIN, 2007, 40).  The weakness of the central government 
contributed towards the propensity for Iraqis to seek assistance and redress 
grievances through the many civil society organizations operating in Iraq, 
including 32 international humanitarian NGOs (UNAMI, 2007).  The 
counterinsurgency manual directly recognized the value of civil society 
organizations when listing as one of its broad indicators of progress the “presence 
or absence of associations…formation and presence of multiple political parties, 
independent, professional associations, and trade unions” (COIN, 2007, 107).  The 
Counterinsurgency Manual also addressed both the beneficial and detrimental 
potential of the media.10  In the absence of a local council, military commanders 
are to help fill the void. 
                                                 
9 “An increase in network density indicates the likelihood that the insurgent groups can plan and 
execute coordinated attacks.  A decrease in network density means the group is reduced to 
fragmented or individual-level attacks (COIN, 2007, 220).”  
10 From the counterinsurgency manual: “Embedding for days rather than weeks runs the risk of 
media representatives not gaining any real understanding of the context of operations and may 
lead to unintended misinformation” (COIN, 2007, 90). 
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Encourage the populace to create such a body.  Teachers, businessmen, and 
others who enjoy the respect of the community should be strongly 
encouraged to come together and form a temporary council to serve in such 
capacity until a more permanent organization can be elected. (COIN, 2007, 
95) 
 
Civil society organizations, like the Fund for Peace, have recognized the value of 
their own expertise in training peacekeepers to develop cultural sensitivities and 
offering historical background to conflicts (Taft, 2005). 
Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) are a model of civil-military 
cooperation (Taft, 2006).  These PRTs have been used in Afghanistan and are 
increasingly being employed in Iraq.  In Afghanistan PRTs consisted of coalition 
and NATO elements alongside “50 to 300 troops as well as representatives from 
multinational development and diplomatic agencies” (COIN, 2007, 44).  PRTs are 
a creative step forward in utilizing social capital in war zones.  Similarly, the 
“Human Terrain System”, a project embedding anthropologists and sociologists 
with US Army regiments in “human terrain teams,” is an attempt to strengthen the 
bonds of the social network working for the betterment of Iraq (Rohde, 2007).  
Anthropologists are experts in the analysis of social forces.  Their use in 
Afghanistan and Iraq is an attempt to increase social capital between the military 
and the population through expertise.11  Provincial Reconstruction Teams and the 
Human Terrain System represent progress in the use of social capital for the 
improvement of Iraq.  Their true impact will depend on the level of support they 
enjoy from US reconstruction officials and the US military.   
A more illustrative case for the value of social capital may be found in the 
mixed results of the Local Governance Project.  The Local Governance Project 
(LGP) was an umbrella initiative that included the “establishment of representative 
councils, service delivery capacity-building, civil society strengthening, 
decentralization policy development and civic dialogue” (Brinkerhoff, 2005, 1).  
The potential of the LGP was enormous.  Local councils could be crucial in 
fostering a broader sense of community responsibility and in identifying needs and 
concerns.  Council members would be empowered to use their position as a 
mechanism of change “in addressing their concerns by reaching out to a variety of 
sources” (Brinkerhoff, 2005, 12).  The success of these councils depended on the 
constant reinforcement of social capital.  The number of citizens participating in 
Baghdad neighborhood council elections increased as “experience accumulated 
                                                 
11 The American Anthropological Association objects to the use of anthropologists as part of the 
Human Terrain System because of ethical considerations.    
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and the process and objectives became better known” (Brinkerhoff, 2005, 10).  The 
LGP has also benefited existing civil society groups by reinforcing “social capital 
through increasing opportunities for communication and knowledge transfer 
among social and ethnic groups” (Brinkeroff, 2005, 11).   
The LGP had several success stories worth noting.  It succeeded in assisting the 
Association of Disabled Veterans in al-Basrah in rehabilitating a community 
facility for physical therapy, training and recreation.  The LGP also helped pool the 
resources of groups with common interests as it did in Kirkuk in August 2003 with 
the support of a conference on civil society development.  In Karbala, LGP staff 
“provided training to the Iraqi Human Rights Watch and the Former Prisoners and 
Families of Victims Association to organize outreach and dissemination 
workshops” (Brinkerhoff, 2005, 7).   
The LGP ran into several obstacles that greatly attenuated its long-term 
contributions to a peaceful and stable Iraq.  The first was a built-in illegitimacy due 
to its foreign origins; some even saw them as an American import (Brinkerhoff, 
2005).  The application of local governance projects also carried with them an 
inherent contradiction: “fulfilling targets mandated by CPA [Coalition Provisional 
Authority] to keep to the programmatic script for Iraq’s reconstruction, while 
building local government and civil society and responding to local demand” 
(Brinkerhoff, 2005, 3).  In other words, the LGP had to serve too many masters.  
Dialogue sessions moderated under the auspices of the LGP were effective “largely 
due to the ability of the facilitators to express these concepts within an Iraqi 
context, confronting different ways in which Islam, tribalism, and Arab and Iraqi 
could be defined in ways that made them compatible with democracy” 
(Brinkerhoff, 2005, 9).  This was seemingly lost on donors to the LGP who 
typically exercised excessive control, sacrificing long-term legitimacy for “short-
term engineered outcomes that accord with their predetermined preferences” 
(Brinkerhoff, 2005, 14).   
Scholars of social capital have observed that the greater the interpretation of 
vertical linkages and horizontal bridging social capital, the more likely it is that a 
society will possess inclusive and democratic institutions that foster cohesiveness 
and conflict mediation (Colletta and Cullen, 2000).  The lesson of the Local 
Governance Project is that viable governance in Iraq depends on the restoration of 
vertical social capital, reconnecting citizens with government in a constructive 
manner, and encouraging bridging capital across sectarian lines (Brinkerhoff, 
2005).   
In the end social capital is only a tool.  How well we use this tool will depend 
on how well we learn from past failures, build on instances of success, and plan for 
the future.  While it is hard to argue against increasing security and quality of life 
for Iraqis through social capital, there exist influential competing alternatives.  The 
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most popular is the partitioning of Iraq along sectarian lines.  Scholars argue that 
the US must put aside any “preconceived notion about preferred outcomes, such as 
multinational democracy, and accept a more workable outcome” (Baker, 2007, 11).  
This “Union of Iraqi States” would ensure the peaceful and stable coexistence of 
all of Iraq’s proud communities and allow US troops to withdraw (Baker, 2007).  
While Americans may support this partition plan because of frustration with 
current approaches, it ignores the wishes of the Iraqi people.  When asked of the 
importance of the establishment of a unity government to the future peace and 
stability of Iraq, 89 percent described this as extremely important (IRI, 2006, 22).  
More directly, 66 percent of Iraqis strongly disagreed with the “segregation of 
Iraqis according to religious or ethnic lines” (IRI, 2006, 40).  It is highly doubtful 
that a segregation of Iraqis, against their will and necessitating military action, 
would redress the longstanding grievances the communities of Iraq have against 
one another or produce a peaceful and stable society.   
The future of Iraq will be highly dependent on the role social capital plays in 
the national reconciliation and reconstruction efforts.  The American military and 
reconstruction apparatus have not completely ignored social capital to date.  
Rather, their policies could be accurately described as sporadically supportive, 
frequently erosive, and generally dismissive.  The United States has a unique 
obligation and lone ability to effect deep change in Iraq.  If the United States is to 
leave behind a viable government and stable society in Iraq it must readjust its 
policies and reallocate its resources to reflect the centrality of social capital 
formation. 
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